

1. The first step in the process is to identify the problem or issue that needs to be addressed. This involves gathering information and understanding the context of the problem.

2. Once the problem is identified, the next step is to define the objectives and goals of the project. This helps to clarify what needs to be achieved and provides a clear direction for the team.

3. The third step is to develop a plan or strategy to address the problem. This involves breaking down the problem into smaller, manageable tasks and determining the resources needed to complete each task.

4. The fourth step is to implement the plan. This involves putting the strategy into action and monitoring progress regularly to ensure that the project is on track.

5. Finally, the fifth step is to evaluate the results of the project. This involves assessing the outcomes against the objectives and goals and identifying any areas for improvement.

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## Strategic Culture and Ballistic Missile Defense: Russia and the United States

by

**Miriam D. Becker**

## June 1993

**Thesis Advisor:**  
**Co-Advisor:**

**David S. Yost**  
**Patrick J. Parker**

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STRATEGIC CULTURE AND BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE:  
Russia and the United States

by

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Lieutenant, United States Navy  
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
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


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## ABSTRACT

This thesis examines U.S. and Russian history and current policy debates to advance understanding of: 1) the strategic cultures of these nations, particularly with respect to BMD policies in the recent past; and 2) whether and how their strategic cultures and approaches to BMD are changing and how that may affect future strategic BMD developments and the status of the ABM Treaty. The development of BMD strategies, including policies concerning the ABM Treaty, within the framework of the established American and Russian strategic cultures is studied, with due attention to the Soviet experience and legacy in the Russian case. U.S. strategic culture does not seem to have changed significantly with the end of the Cold War, but U.S. BMD priorities have been redefined to reflect a higher priority attached to regional and theater-level defenses. It is apparent that the Soviet experience did have a significant impact on Russian strategic culture. Faced with major changes in its international status, domestic political-military arrangements, and scope of national security concerns, Russian strategic culture is nonetheless moving beyond the old Soviet culture. Future Russian policies regarding the transfer of BMD technology, sharing early warning data, and participating in a global protective system are heavily dependent on domestic political developments.

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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This thesis examines U.S. and Russian history and current policies debates to advance understanding of: 1) the strategic cultures of these nations, particularly with respect to BMD policies in the recent past; and 2) whether and how their strategic cultures and approaches to BMD are changing and how that may affect future strategic BMD developments and the status of the ABM Treaty.

Strategic culture is a fluid and elusive concept. Strategic culture refers to a nation's traditions, values, attitudes, patterns of behavior, habits, symbols, achievements and particular ways of adapting to the security environment and solving problems with respect to the threat or use of force. In short, it defines a set of patterns regarding a nation's behavior on war and peace issues. It is derived from a nation's history, geography and political culture, and represents the aggregate of attitudes and patterns of behavior of the influential voices, i.e., the political and military elites.

The concept of strategic culture should not be considered a comprehensive explanation of a nation's strategy. It defines policy boundaries and assumptions, but may not always determine concrete policy choices. It is simply another analytical tool that may be of assistance in understanding the determinants and probable course of national strategies. Issues as complex as national strategy require examination from multiple, diverse perspectives if a deeper understanding is to be achieved.

This thesis first offers an assessment of U.S. and Russian strategic cultures. The development of BMD strategies, including policies concerning the ABM Treaty, within the framework of the established American and Russian strategic cultures is then studied, with due attention to the Soviet experience and legacy in the Russian case. Differences in the BMD development and deployment strategies can thus be elucidated.

On this basis judgements regarding future prospects for the ABM Treaty and BMD policies in both countries are offered.

U.S. strategic culture does not seem to have radically changed despite the consequences of the dissolution of the USSR on the international environment. Rather, as a result of the global changes traditional U.S. attitudes appear to have been reinforced.

On the other hand, Russian strategic culture is encountering a perception of heightened insecurity on the regional level, which is resulting in an increasing reliance on nuclear weapons to meet national security needs. This perception is reinforced by the disintegration of the Russian economic infrastructure which traditionally supported the military's requirements. In order to confront the increasingly intense competition for economic resources and new technology, Russia may be forced to rely on Western aid until Moscow considers itself relatively self-sufficient.

In assessing Russian strategic culture, it is apparent that the Soviet experience did have significant impact. Faced with major changes in its international status, domestic political-military arrangements, and scope of national security threats, Russian strategic culture is nonetheless moving beyond the old Soviet culture.

If strategic BMD deployments beyond those allowed by the 1974 protocol to the ABM Treaty are to be made, the ABM Treaty must be changed or abrogated. The possible receptivity of Russia in various circumstances to amending the ABM Treaty to permit various types of expanded deployments, including ground- or space-based, remains highly dependent on the course of domestic politics in Russia. Some elite circles in Russia, particularly supporters of Yeltsin in the scientific community, might be more open to transferring BMD technology, sharing early warning data, and participating in a global protective system. The current trend in Russian elite circles seems to be one of growing caution about such cooperation with the United States.

## I. INTRODUCTION

*If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in every battle.* Sun Tzu [Ref.12:p.18]

To heed Sun Tzu's warning, many theories have been generated that attempt to explain *why* particular nations, governments, and military establishments operate in specific ways. The ability not only to explain previous strategic choices but also to reach informed judgements about a country's probable future behavior has become even more important with the advent of nuclear weapons. Military, political and academic thinkers have developed theories based on models, such as bureaucratic and institutional patterns of interaction and decision-making, ideology, cultural factors, and systemic level analysis. No one theory has yet been able to offer a complete explanation or consistently reliable forecasts of a nation's strategy and actions.

This thesis is an effort to advance understanding of one aspect of the *why*, namely: strategic culture, in the context of ballistic missile defense (BMD). This thesis examines the United States and Russia to determine: 1) their strategic cultures; 2) the basis of their BMD strategies in the recent past; and 3) whether and how their strategic cultures and approaches to BMD are changing and how that may affect future strategic BMD developments and the status of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty.

The following variables are addressed in this thesis: historical experiences of war; a nation's definition of its role in international politics; decision-making structures for policy definitions; BMD policy; defense budget trends; arms control; and national security strategy.

#### **A. STRATEGIC CULTURE**

Strategic culture is a fluid and elusive concept. The concept was first introduced in a 1977 RAND study on the USSR by Jack Snyder. Ken Booth probably provides the most detailed definition of the concept. According to Booth, strategic culture "refers to a nation's traditions, values, attitudes, patterns of behavior, habits, symbols, achievements and particular ways of adapting to the environment and solving problems with respect to the threat or use of force." In short, it defines a set of patterns of and for a nation's behavior on war and peace issues. It is derived from a nation's history, geography and political culture, and represents the aggregate of attitudes and patterns of behavior of the most influential voices, i.e., the political and military elites. [Ref.18:p.121]

Others have also addressed the issue of strategic culture. Colin Gray regards it as "a pattern of national response to challenge that has worked adequately in the past." [Ref.6:p.37] David Jones attributes some other elements to the concept, such as: 1) synergy of the state's ethnic culture and history; 2) social-economic and governmental-administrative systems and technology base; and 3) the network of military-administrative institutions and patterns of military-political interaction. [Ref.29:p.37] Obviously, the concept can be expanded to

include many variables. Though it is not advocated as a comprehensive explanation of national behavior, the concept of strategic culture may be a useful tool for clarifying anomalies discovered in other methods of strategic analysis.

The United States and Russia have undergone extraordinary yet interdependent evolutionary changes during this century in the realms of technology, military capacity, political character, economics and societal composition. As strategic culture is a dynamic concept, any changes should be reflected in their respective BMD strategies. Ken Booth suggests that those factors must be assessed "that are likely to lead to change in national strategic styles....Among such factors identified...the most important are as follows: the failure of existing strategies, generational changes, major domestic upheavals, technological revolutions, significant developments in the international environment, and learning from others." [Ref.18:p.127] Accordingly, major changes would be expected in both the American and Russian strategic cultures, given the dramatic history of this century.

Ken Booth's supposition concerning changes in strategic culture, as noted above, requires that analysis of each nation's strategic culture undergo at least periodic review and updating in order to remain accurate and germane. As already mentioned, strategic culture is a fluid concept with no clearly defined boundaries. This leaves much room for argument pertaining to the actual usefulness and reliability of such a concept. Its nebulousness carries the risk that the concept will be used as a "catch-all" by those unable to wholly explain the

basis of a nation's strategy via other methods. These potential pitfalls demand the prudent use of this concept in conjunction with other means of analysis if it is to remain viable and credible.

The argument for the need of multiple methods in analysis is made by Andrew Marshall. In an attempt to improve "intelligence forecasting of Soviet military forces," Marshall examined several analytical models. [Ref.8:p.6] Multiple methods used in conjunction allow asymmetries and similarities of national strategies to be more intelligently identified, compared, explained and forecasted. Marshall notes that "the comparison of simple number counts or the comparison of the technology in individual weapons can be very misleading" when not put into context with other factors. [Ref.8:p.16] Training, doctrine, tactics and strategic culture exemplify these other factors. The strategic culture approach may prove essential if the results of conventional methods of analysis are to be interpreted as perceptively as possible.

Strategic culture studies are also useful because they call attention to the dangers of ethnocentrism in strategic thought. [Ref.40] Students of strategic affairs are cautioned not to project their standards and motives on others, and not to assume that their national traditions are superior, since these assumptions may lead to misunderstanding the intentions of others. Ethnocentrism may lead to overlooking the significance of differences because of assumptions that both parties view an issue in the same way. [Ref.44:pp.15-16]

The concept of strategic culture should not be considered a comprehensive explanation of a nation's strategy. It defines policy boundaries and assumptions, but may not always determine concrete policy choices. It is simply another tool that may be of assistance in understanding national strategies. Issues as complex as national strategy require examination from multiple, diverse perspectives if a deeper understanding is to be achieved.

## **B. BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE**

The pursuit of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles since the 1940s has confirmed the Soviet theory of a "dialectic of arms development" in that the development of offensive armaments has resulted in the near-concurrent conception of defensive systems, i.e., ballistic missile defenses. [Ref.16:p.21] The nature of each country's BMD systems is, however, very different not only physically, but also in purpose. The concept of strategic culture may shed some light on the origins of these differences. The knowledge gained from examining the U.S. and Russian strategic cultures may, it is hoped, provide insights regarding the past and potential future BMD strategies of these nations.

In view of the current political instability within Russia, innumerable scenarios exist regarding Russia's possible future. This thesis assumes that the integrity of the Russian state will be maintained.

One of the purposes of this thesis is to explore the extent to which strategic culture can explain the development of the BMD strategies of the United States

and Russia. To set the scene for a more detailed discussion in Chapter III of the development of BMD strategies, a brief description of BMD follows.

A ballistic missile defense system is designed to defend a target from an incoming ballistic missile attack. The missile or its warheads would be targeted for interception during at least one of four basic flight phases: boost, post-boost, mid-course and terminal. A BMD system consists of several components, including radars, computerized targeting systems, interceptors, and command, control and communication (C<sup>3</sup>). The system components could be ground-, air-, sea-, or space-based, and either fixed or mobile. [Ref.11:pp.49-97] BMD against strategic missiles and warheads is one element of active strategic defense. Strategic defense encompasses both passive and active elements. Civil defense, mobility, deception, and silo hardening are examples of passive defenses, while BMD and air defense are typical of active strategic defenses.

A defense against ballistic missiles has been sought ever since Germany launched its V-2 at England in World War II. During the Cold War from the late 1940s to 1989-1991, the Soviet Union and the United States conducted the most extensive R&D programs in this endeavor. In late 1945 the U.S. Army Air Force (USAAF) Scientific Advisory Group suggested a program to defend the United States against V-2-type missiles, possibly by using nuclear-tipped homing rockets "and some form of energy beam." [Ref.13:p.4] By March 1946 the USAAF had contracted two BMD projects--Project WIZARD and Project THUMPER (canceled in 1948). In 1958 WIZARD became part of the NIKE-ZEUS ABM system. NIKE-



ZEUS interceptors were equipped with nuclear warheads. [Ref.13:pp.6-7] With the development of the SAFEGUARD ABM system in 1969, interceptors have been designed to use conventional warheads. No U.S. strategic BMD system is currently deployed.

The Soviet Union's initial BMD systems were modifications of its air defense systems. The GRIFFON surface-to-air missile (SAM) was deployed in 1962 in a BMD mode around Leningrad. This system was dismantled in 1964. In 1963 the SA-5 SAM was deployed near Estonia, supposedly for missile defense, and it was also dismantled shortly thereafter. By 1972 the Soviets had deployed the GALOSH ABM system around Moscow. This system contained nuclear-armed missiles designed for exoatmospheric interceptions. [Ref.17:pp.27-28] The GALOSH system (subsequently modernized) remains in place.

Both countries have viewed BMD as part of their overall national strategies, though their policies have differed at times as to the exact role of BMD. The United States has generally viewed BMD as a separate part of its nuclear deterrence strategy, while the USSR considered BMD integral to its overall operational and damage-limitation strategy.

In 1972 the USSR and the United States signed the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty as part of the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT) I accords. This treaty placed restrictions on strategic BMD deployment, while still allowing R&D.

The status of the ABM Treaty is being questioned and the need for a strategic BMD system is being argued in some quarters, in view of the dramatic changes in the international environment. These changes include the upheavals in the former Soviet Union, the proliferation of ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons technology, and the increasing potential for regional conflicts involving ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons. The question of whether the ABM Treaty should be maintained, amended or abrogated is certain to be posed more sharply in the future. Will more advanced strategic BMD development and deployment be pursued by Russia and/or the United States? The concept of strategic culture may identify policy determinants that could shed light on these questions.

Turning from introduction to analysis, this thesis first offers an assessment of the U.S. and Russian strategic cultures. The review of Russian strategic culture unavoidably raises the question of the extent to which Soviet strategic culture was an extension of Russian culture. If this were the case, elements of pre-Soviet Russian strategic culture might persist. In view of Booth's theories of change in strategic culture, it is possible that the Soviet period uniquely affected Russian culture to some degree, creating a "hybrid" with enduring consequences. The possibilities are addressed in Chapter II.

The development of BMD strategies within the framework of the established American and Russian strategic cultures is then studied in Chapter III. In Chapter IV differences in the BMD development and deployment strategies are elucidated, it is hoped, in light of the differences in their respective strategic

cultures. Judgements regarding the future prospects for BMD in both countries are offered in Chapter V, the conclusion.

## **II. U.S. AND RUSSIAN STRATEGIC CULTURE**

The purpose of this chapter is to identify the strategic cultures of the United States and Russia. The first section is devoted to U.S. strategic culture. U.S. strategic culture is examined using the following variables: historical experiences of war; self-defined role in international politics; decision-making structures for policy definitions; defense budget trends; arms control; and national security strategy. A summary of U.S. strategic culture is provided at the end of the section.

The second section of this chapter discusses Russian strategic culture utilizing the same variables as above. One of the major questions is, to what degree did the Soviet experience affect the traditional Russian culture? The section concludes with an assessment of the extent to which the Soviet experience appears to have affected Russian strategic culture.

### **A. U.S. STRATEGIC CULTURE**

How has the distinctive "American way" developed and pervaded the nation's strategy? This section seeks to identify the characteristics and determinants of American strategic culture. America's strategic culture is derived from "geopolitical, historical, economic and other unique influences." Colin Gray notes that U.S. strategic ideas and defense policy are debated and formed within this context. [Ref.6:p.36]

Five factors have contributed to the development of American strategic culture: 1) continental insulation; 2) the remoteness of serious security dangers, owing in part to the military weakness of immediate neighbors; 3) the experience of taming a frontier of continental proportions; 4) enduring fundamentalist religious beliefs; and 5) a national substructure of immigrants. [Ref.6:p.40] These factors helped to form the American ethos. Escaping repression, immigrants came to this continent intent on building a new country and a new and better life for themselves and their children. Previous political, social, and religious constraints were thrown off; unexplored land was conquered; and the New World was seemingly isolated from European political struggles. The United States became a safe haven.

The conviction evolved that the people who had fled European oppression and power politics had already suffered enough and that it was now unthinkable that they might suffer again in their new country. Gray also notes that Americans have come to expect the condition of relative safety as a norm. [Ref.6:pp.56-57] This condition was born of their newly won isolation and enhanced by its continuity in security terms. The result is what might be called a relatively low "tolerance of pain," in comparison with the sufferings of the Russians over the centuries. Exemplary of these contrasting experiences is the loss of life in World War II. With roughly equal populations in the United States and the USSR, the U.S. fatalities amounted to about one-tenth of one percent or 260,000. Soviet fatalities roughly equaled eleven percent of the population, or 20 million.

[Ref.50:p.218] In addition, most of the fatalities the United States has suffered in war have occurred overseas. Even the costly U.S. Civil War, with approximately 620,000 military fatalities, does not even compare with the military *and civilian* losses that Russia has endured within its own borders throughout history. [Ref.59:p.854]

### 1. Historical Experiences of War

The development of the United States into a nation was a unique experience compared to that of other countries, especially as far as the role of the military was concerned. The seventeenth century colonial period was fraught with violent struggles for personal survival and imperial expansion into the New World. No centralized military force existed nor was one desired. As the colonies developed, so too did their military potential. However, they never had more than a fairly low capacity for self-defense, particularly against the Indians. "With great strength but weak defenses, the colonies experienced warfare less in terms of protection...than in terms of retribution, of retaliating against violence already committed." [Ref.46:pp.212-213] Certain similarities to U.S. nuclear strategy are apparent. That is, U.S. nuclear strategy has relied on threats of nuclear retaliation to certain acts of aggression, while no effective defense against nuclear weapons has been deployed; and efforts to develop such a defense have been intermittent.

John Shy points out that almost every war in Europe in the seventeenth and much of the eighteenth centuries also meant the extension of war into North

America. The solution to the vulnerability, disruption and insecurity the colonists felt began to be expressed in terms of definitive military action. Shy states, that from the American point of view, the Seven Years War (1755-63), the Revolutionary War (1775-83), and the War of 1812 (1812-1814) revealed a remarkable pattern of early setbacks followed by military recovery, perseverance, and ultimate victory. "In each the very existence of American society was seen to be at stake." After the latter war the United States was essentially safe from further European military intervention in its affairs. [Ref.46:pp.214-215] The United States was able to enter the next century, which some have called the age of free security, with an established set of military attitudes.

These attitudes included deep respect for the kind of military prowess the new nation represented. But this was also mixed with the traditional colonial anxiety about a strong, centralized military establishment. Another belief was that the concept of military security could now be expressed in absolute terms. No longer would the American society be at the mercy of the European powers. The exceptional optimism felt about what could be accomplished, when necessary, with American military force is also noteworthy. The international events of this period with which the United States was involved, e.g., expansion into the Pacific arena, only strengthened "the belief that military security was an absolute value...and the American society had been granted it, presumably deserved it, and ought to be able to keep it." [Ref.46:p.216] In general these beliefs seem to have

not only survived into the 20th century but also to have been reinforced by other elements of the American experience, to be noted below.

## **2. Decision-Making Structures**

Other important points concerning the development of the United States as a nation and a state are pertinent in this regard. The colonists who came to the New World in general wanted to leave behind the repressive regimes of Europe and be able to practice religious freedoms and to freely seek new economic opportunities. Therefore, a deep-rooted suspicion was held against the idea of creating a new government and military based on highly, centralized principles. The democratic governmental system established by the United States was built upon the principles of compromise and consensus, with a separation of powers and checks and balances, and was one in which the rule of law was paramount.

The belief within American society in the centrality of the law has been assumed by many to be true as well in the international arena. This would help explain the significance given to international agreements and arms-control efforts, e.g., Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT) I and II. It might also explain why this country, upon entering such agreements, strictly adheres to them, e.g., the ABM Treaty. Other nations, however, are not necessarily so scrupulous. The dismay and disbelief felt by the informed U.S. public when another country violates such an agreement is evidence of the tendency to project U.S. values onto other countries. This may account for the confusion and hostility experienced when it is recognized that other countries do not behave as the



United States does. The centrality of the law has also meant that the use of military force must be justified as necessary and pursued for a legal purpose—for example, human rights protection or national security requirements.

The aforementioned factors have led to the development of certain U.S. strategic perceptions. Some of the traditional American strategic beliefs have been identified as follows: 1) "good" causes triumph; 2) the United States can succeed in anything it energetically pursues; 3) Americans cannot fail since they are God's chosen people; and 4) the United States can outproduce any enemy in the materials needed for victory. [Ref.6:p.xi] The moral and religious infusions are very apparent, which is not surprising given that these were fundamental principles of this country's conception.

### **3. National Security Strategy**

Shy suggests that these optimistic attitudes have been reflected in U.S. military doctrines over time. This has resulted in an implicit assumption that, if the doctrine is followed, military success will be swift and complete. Noting that the American national identity has become closely associated with military prowess, the society has come to expect (and even to demand) success. No flexibility has been allowed in societal, governmental or military thinking to be able to accept and to surmount fundamental failure; only temporary setbacks are tolerable. [Ref.46:pp.226,228] This lack of experience in dealing with and overcoming serious military failures will probably continue to have a lasting impact on U.S. national security .

The aptness of the above observations is demonstrated by the reaction of the American society to the failure to meet military objectives in the Korean War (and later in the Vietnam War). As Shy states, for the first time disappointment and disgust, in addition to moral and political disapproval, sparked the antiwar movement's emotional outpourings. "Even the outrage of the young [indicated the extent] they were taught to expect a smooth, cleaner American military performance, and how little prepared they were to face the prospect of failure; their expectations and standards for judging international behavior [were] as inordinately high as those of a John Foster Dulles or a Lyndon B. Johnson." Shy concludes that the effects of confessed failure may be felt, and severely at that, for an extended period. [Ref.46:p.228] Indeed, Shy's somber prediction seems to have been confirmed, as even today the justification procedures and requirements for U.S. military action are still heavily debated.

Others have noted that general U.S. public attitudes toward nuclear strategy and nuclear weapons were rather relaxed in the 1970s. This could be attributed to the perception of a lessened risk of nuclear war caused by defense budget limitations, arms-control efforts and nuclear strategies designed to reduce U.S.-Soviet competition. [Ref.47:p.20]

However, in the mid- to late-1970s a sense of uncertainty was growing among U.S. strategists, policymakers and academics due to the scope and intensity of Soviet strategic programs. Harold Brown, who was Secretary of Defense in 1977-1981, observed that the Soviets were continuing in their strategic

force expansion efforts despite arms control accords, e.g., SALT I and II. The Soviets were the first to deploy MRBMs, IRBMs, ICBMs, and ABMs; to test ASATs and Fractional Orbital Bombardment Systems (FOBS); and to MIRV IRBMs. Leon Gouré notes that the main U.S. concern was the realization that American assumptions about Soviet intentions and defense policies were wrong, i.e., mirror-image analysis could no longer be assumed to be accurate. [Ref.7:p.2] Representative of how mirror-image analysis affected U.S. policy-making and led to erroneous conclusions, is a 1968 statement to Congress by Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara concerning the deployment of the NIKE-X ABM system. On the premise of a Soviet desire to maintain a nuclear deterrent against the United States, "...any attempt on our part to reduce their "Assured Destruction" capability below what they might consider necessary to deter us would simply cause them to respond with an offsetting increase in their offensive forces. It is precisely this process of action and reaction upon which the arms race feeds, at great cost to both sides and benefit to neither." [Ref.14:p.63]

The Soviet force buildup in the 1970s demonstrated that McNamara was mistaken. Even though the United States had accepted the ABM Treaty and was making no effort to reduce the USSR's "assured destruction" capability, the Soviets were continuing to build more ICBMs and other intercontinental strike systems. Many, but not all, in the United States finally comprehended that parity in strategic offensive forces had not been accepted by the Soviets as had been thought. [Ref.7:pp.1-2] It also meant the tenets of arms control and deterrence

based on a model of mutual vulnerability to retaliatory attack--sometimes called "mutual assured destruction" (MAD)--were not accepted.

Gray argues that the 1980s saw a decrease in America's self-confidence with respect to U.S. nuclear strategy of the 1960s and 1970s. The American strategic beliefs of the 1980s, as Gray presents them, are probably valid for the 1990s as well. As presented, they are: 1) nuclear wars cannot be "won"; 2) other cultures will soon share U.S. ideas; 3) strategic defenses are not only ineffective, but also endanger the United States by exacerbating the arms race; 4) Russian leaders can be educated into more constructive modes of thought and policy; 5) the U.S. defense establishment is as much the enemy as the former Soviet Union's defense establishment; and 6) for structural-societal reasons the United States is and will remain superior in defense ideas and in defense technology. [Ref.6:p.xi] Upon examination of the above, one notes some sense of continuity with America's traditional attitudes. Namely, America's military might is held in great esteem, yet many Americans are still troubled by being required to field a large military force. With the threats to U.S. national security seemingly remote and the assertion that foreign nations value international law as Americans do, Americans tend to project a more democratic and benign image upon the world abroad than is objectively warranted.

#### **4. Role of Informed Public**

During the late 1970s and early 1980s a breakdown in domestic consensus occurred in the United States concerning nuclear policies in Europe and

the United States, e.g., deployments of ground-launched cruise missiles and Pershing II ballistic missiles. The public which formed this consensus was not the mass public, but rather former government and military officials, the upper echelons of academia, politically involved interest groups and certain members of the media. Harold Brown believed that the causes for this breakdown were: 1) the increased tensions in relations between the United States and the USSR, 2) dimmed prospects for new arms-control agreements, e.g., failure of SALT II to be ratified, and 3) a growing perception in the United States, Japan and Western Europe that the Soviets were ahead in strategic nuclear forces, medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs), and conventional forces. [Ref.47:pp.19-21] Hence President Jimmy Carter began a vigorous program (continued under President Ronald Reagan) to build up the armed forces to once again protect this country's national interests.

The development of U.S. strategic policy is subject to diverse forces. Fritz Ermarth has proposed that U.S. strategic policy is a composite of behavior occurring in three overlapping arenas: 1) operational and war planning; 2) system and force acquisition; and, most importantly, 3) public debate. The result is a "democratic" process of strategy-making which produces no clear-cut or definite articulation of U.S. policy on particular issues. [Ref.23:p.142] The democratic process--including changes of administration and legislative-executive interactions--also complicates attempts to devise and adhere to a truly long-term strategy.

## **5. Strategic Policy-Making Process**

Since the 1960s, the U.S. strategic policy-making process has been influenced by some historical factors. First, the McNamara legacy has had a lasting impact on the process. Defense leadership style under the direction of Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara relied on managerial skills and quantitative analysis rather than on strategic experience and qualitative attributes (e.g., traditional military judgement and experience). [Ref.6:p.40] The U.S. military voluntarily accepts and upholds a constitutional order with a civilian-controlled establishment.

A second factor, Gray has argued, is the inability of the United States to accept "nuclear war as *war*." The thought of nuclear war contradicts Western democratic and moral values, and encourages instead an emphasis on pre-war deterrence. [Ref.6:p.40] Fritz Ermarth has also noted this point, stating that the United States tries not to believe in the feasibility of victory in such a war, considering the consequences of waging such operations. Therefore, in the opinion of a widespread constituency in U.S. elite circles, defenses (such as BMD, civil and air defenses) against nuclear war are unnecessary for a nation's survival and in fact may be destabilizing. [Ref.23:p.144] Such defenses, some believe, may destabilize the strategic situation by prompting a preemptive first-strike or by further fueling the arms race. This view tends to reflect the rational-actor model of thinking.

The loss of strategic nuclear superiority is a third factor. This was, however, accepted by U.S. elites with the hope that the Soviet Union's confidence and sense of security would then increase, allowing the USSR to become a satisfied, *status quo*-oriented power, rather than an expansionistic empire. The fourth point follows therefrom. The United States has endorsed theories of strategic stability which rationalized the loss of strategic superiority. The fifth and final factor, Gray has suggested, is the American unwillingness to recognize the USSR, and now Russia, as a unique adversary. [Ref.6:pp.40-41] This is again evidence of the American tendency to ethnocentrism—that is, projecting U.S. values and objectives onto others. An example of this ethnocentrism is provided by Alain C. Enthoven and K. Wayne Smith, U.S. defense officials under McNamara, who wrote in 1971 as follows:

[If] deterrence is also the Soviet's objective (as the available evidence has consistently and strongly suggested), we would expect them to react in much the same way to any effort on our part to reduce the effectiveness of their deterrent (or assured-destruction) capability against us....In other words, any attempt on our part to reduce damage to our society would put pressure on the Soviets to strive for an offsetting improvement in *their* assured-destruction forces, and vice versa....This "action-reaction" phenomenon is central to all strategic force planning issues as well as to any theory of an arms race. [Ref.60:pp.175-176]

Fritz Ermarth also points out ethnocentric weaknesses in U.S. strategic culture such as the misperception (or the mistaken assumption) that the views of the Russians are similar to, or at least converging towards, U.S. positions. One

source of this misperception may have been the tendency in the post-World War II period to view strategy as "an institutional and intellectual offspring of the natural sciences that spawned modern weapons." [Ref.23:p.140] In other words, U.S. policymakers naively, and perhaps unthinkingly, judged that the near-simultaneous development of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, would mean the development of the same strategies in the two major powers to acquire large quantities of such weapons and delivery systems--a mistake of the first order.

Gray asserts that U.S. strategic culture is oriented towards problem solving. It does not accept readily the idea of continuing conflict such as was part of the Soviet ideology. [Ref.6:p.142] The idea that certain parties may not even want to agree on an issue, e.g., the Yugoslav situation, is antithetical to the American capitalist assumption that issues must be resolved in order for commerce to prosper. American strategic thinking has tended to be based on short-term goals. Strategic thinking, using Henry Kissinger's 1957 definition, is the ability to relate power to political purpose. Overall, grand strategic thinking is not widely practiced in major areas of U.S. defense planning, reflecting a national shortcoming even before the nuclear age. [Ref.6:pp.45,48]

In addition, "the constituency required to sustain a project rarely lasts for more than two or three years." [Ref.45:p.66] Top level policymakers come and go, constantly requiring to be briefed each time by civil servants that provide a measure of continuity. Compared to the United States, the Soviet Union did not have the same problems with program instability because of its politically



supported long-term goals, centralized decision-making and incremental technological advances. Of course, with the collapse of the Soviet Union the political situation within Russia may show itself to be more unstable and thus subject to problems in long-term planning and policy implementation similar to (or worse than) those in the United States. American companies have worked at developing dedicated, long-lived support for various projects. [Ref.45:pp.65-69] The ultimate approval still requires the compromise and consensus upon which this government operates.

## **6. Conclusion**

The U.S. language of war has made its focus not how to control people, as was the case in the USSR, but how to conduct war to minimize U.S. casualties and, notably, to avoid ground force action. [Ref.18:p.32] This tendency may have been reinforced during the McNamara period. Robert Bathurst also supports Gray's observation of America's tendency to rely on technical "fixes." He notes (as does Shy) that the American approach to war is based on inundation, prolonging the preparation for war and then massing superior forces--in short, utilizing America's wealth and geographic isolation. Technological capabilities are thus emphasized, whereas Moscow stresses its massive human resources and their utilization capabilities (to include psychological warfare). [Ref.18:p.37] The role of the civilian sector, or the "rear," during a war is rarely mentioned in U.S. strategy, in contrast with Russian and Soviet traditions. [Ref.18:p.35]

The combination of several of the above factors has created a largely U.S. strategic concept, escalation control, within U.S. strategic culture. Factors such as the emphasis on quantitative strategic analysis, the interest in moral justification, the centrality of the law, and the relatively low threshold for withstanding pain have all influenced the way the United States views war. A prominent school of thought in the United States has even argued that war, especially nuclear war, can be controlled and that other nations also see war in this way. For this school of strategic analysis, the "process of escalation" is seen as a process of political "bargaining." This concept implies that an agreement can be reached to accept or deliver a set amount of punishment prior to war-termination. Another influential school of thought rejects any concern with operational and war-termination issues on the grounds that pre-war deterrence will not fail and that the process of nuclear escalation cannot be controlled, anyway. Both schools of thought are examples of a democratic, pluralistic and commercial society's approach to international security affairs. Again, the United States tends to project its views on others and to assume that they will be accepted.

Some of the main characteristics and determinants of American strategic culture are summarized in Table 2-1. This is by no means a complete assessment of American strategic culture. Nevertheless, it should provide a framework within which to examine the development of U.S. BMD strategy in the next chapter.

U.S. strategic culture does not seem to have radically changed despite the consequences of the dissolution of the USSR on the international environment. Rather, as a result of the global changes traditional U.S. attitudes appear to have been reinforced. For example, nearly every U.S. foreign policy statement advocates the spread of democracy to all countries, assuming that all countries want to be democratic just like the United States [Ref.51:p.1] Perhaps as a result of America's pluralistic approach to issues, changes in U.S. strategic culture will evolve slowly.

**Table 2-1**

**U.S. STRATEGIC CULTURE**

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- Centrality of the rule of law in both domestic and international affairs
  - Pluralistic decision-making process with frequent changes of administrations resulting in short-term planning
  - Military voluntarily accepts and upholds constitutional order with civilian rule
  - Participation of informed public in decision-making process
  - Condition of relative safety as a norm built upon U.S. geographical isolation
  - Use of decisive military force and advanced technology to achieve quick conflict resolution
  - Reliance on economic-technological superiority with little tolerance for mistakes in strategic planning
  - High moral standards—use of force must be justified and pursued for a legal and ethical purpose
  - Little experience of defeat in war, except for the Vietnam conflict
  - Belief that most countries want to be like the U.S. and accept the international leadership role of the United States
  - National and international security issues placed on technical problem-solving level
  - Begrudging support of military force requirements, unless a clear and visible threat is present
  - Belief that victory must entail no more than modest casualties
-

## **B. RUSSIAN STRATEGIC CULTURE**

In examining Russian strategic culture one is struck by its sharp contrast with American strategic culture. Whereas U.S. strategic culture appears to be based upon "ideological" principles, such as constitutionalism and democratic values, Russian strategic culture seems to have been largely forged by practical necessities of geography and history. Understanding the effect of the Soviet experience on Russian strategic culture is central to any attempts to explain current Russian BMD policy goals.

Some of Russia's basic strategic cultural characteristics are rooted in its history. The lack of natural borders has resulted in an expansionist perspective, with the desire to keep the enemy as far away from Moscow as possible. The wide open plains that symbolized new opportunities to Americans stand as a constant reminder of Russia's vulnerability to invasion. Not only was most of Russia invaded by the Mongols (1240-1480), but that extensive rule turned Moscow eastward and caused Russia to lapse behind the mainstream of European political and cultural development. [Ref.29:pp.38-39] In addition to its "defensive" expansionistic propensity, Moscow also desired to obtain land more suitable for agricultural pursuits and mineral extraction than that offered by frozen Siberia.

The Mongol period is also significant for witnessing the initial unification of the Russian state and the rise of Moscow as its historical capital. The consolidation of Russian power and control that ensued both internally and externally through the following centuries eventually resulted in a strong,

centralized government. In order to strengthen the central government and further reduce the power of the former principalities a standing army was formed and became a permanent feature of the Russian state. The government was controlled by the imperial family and favored members of the aristocracy with little participation on the national level by the general populace.

### **1. Historical Experiences of War**

The wars during Russia's imperial age helped to establish it as a major force to be reckoned with in Europe, Asia and the Near East. Concurrently, the Russian government was attempting to maintain internal control, a monumental effort owing to the harsh climate conditions and the lack of any efficient transportation infrastructure. Russia is faced with this situation even today.

The consequence of turning eastward during the Mongol rule was that Russia fell behind in not only its political development but also in its technological development. While Europe entered the Industrial Revolution, Russia still struggled with its medieval vestiges, despite the earlier attempts by Peter the Great and others to drag xenophobic Russia into the West. The result was that while Europe rapidly urbanized and industrialized, Russia remained largely rural and agrarian. While European military weaponry and tactics modernized at an unprecedented rate, Russia fell further behind and lacked the necessary industrial support. In order to overcome these shortcomings of technology, transportation, and infrastructure, the Russian military became very manpower-intensive and had to be forward-deployed to a significant extent.

These shortcomings also obliged the government to rely heavily upon diplomatic and intelligence endeavors to provide adequate warning of imminent hostilities, if they could not be averted.

The arrival of the Soviet system brought about the interaction of Marxist-Leninist ideology, on one hand, and the strategic realities of the geographical and political entity, the Russian empire, on the other. Once Stalin announced his plan for "Socialism in One Country," traditional patterns of Russian social, political and administrative behavior were able to reemerge but under the guise of socialism. [Ref.29:p.35] Though this was reluctantly admitted, Soviet military planning relied heavily on Russian imperialist thinkers.

The Soviet revolution did bring about the breakdown of the old social order. With the goal of building a new socialist state, the general population was offered new opportunities that had not been available to it before, such as: political careers, industrial management, higher educations, and diverse military positions. [Ref.29:p.42] Although the Soviet system did develop its own class divisions, social mobility (indisputably at a high cost) was afforded to many that might not otherwise have had the opportunity. To an extent unknown before, the overall technological and educational level of the populace was raised, aiding the USSR's efforts to further develop its military-industrial sectors.

Soviet ideology justified the maintenance of very large armed forces on various grounds, including the need to be able to spread the "revolution" whenever possible. The result was that, to a remarkable degree, the entire society

within the USSR was militarized. [Ref.9:pp.34-51] Here is a fundamental change from Russian strategic culture. It is consistent with Booth's theory of change in strategic culture, because it reflects a major change in domestic political arrangements.

The high level of militarization obtained under Soviet rule was not only for protection against external threats but also for security against internal disorder. Soviet military and paramilitary organizations were a source of immense pride and were present even at the children's level. The Soviet government used the institutions as tools for creating societal norms and promoting national integration. [Ref.6:p.75] All major reforms were introduced by the Russian state as a result of military necessity. For example, Peter the Great used new military schools to Westernize the gentry in order to modernize his military forces. The Russian state has been the primary agent in initiating social, economic and technological change. [Ref.29:pp.40-41] The impact of the Soviet era's militarization of social institutions, including the prominence of military and paramilitary organizations, on Russian strategic culture can be expected to endure in the years to come. However, the "myth" of the military has been broken along with that of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and the military no longer enjoys the prestige and admiration it once knew.

The vast expanse of the country and the poor communication network required the forward deployment of the Soviet armed forces. These forces had to be highly mobile and designed for offensive operations in many operating



theaters. The Russian soldier thinks in terms of expanses of time and space, to a degree unknown in Western militaries. This thinking provided that if Soviet forces did not succeed at that moment, a new opportunity would emerge at some later time. The Marxist-Leninist ideology reinforced the traditional Russian notion that time and space were on Moscow's side. [Ref.29:pp.45-46]

## 2. The Soviet Experience

A highly centralized government, not subject to effective voter constituencies, is able to more easily develop a long-term, stable military strategy than a democracy subject to shifts in popular moods and changes in leadership. In developing its strategy, the USSR had to take into account some beliefs it inherited from Russian history. These beliefs include:

[First,...crises and wars happen and...war can involve the issue of political and social survival...[Second,] an official ideology that precludes the long-term possibility of recognizing the legitimate interests of antagonistic social systems...[Third,] for the first time since 1917,...[the USSR was] not in a condition of unmistakable military inferiority vis-a-vis plausible (by Soviet reasoning) enemies...[Finally, the USSR was] subject to no known, noteworthy domestic political constraints on its foreign policy behavior,...[though] the pro-defense coalition...[had] to be "on-board" for major foreign policy ventures. [Ref.7:p.55]

Gray states that the Soviet defense establishment's purpose was to defend the Socialist heartland, deter adventurism by desperate capitalists or errant socialists, and seek victory. [Ref.7:p.56] To meet these goals the USSR required

power. The power was to be in the form of the military, upon which rested the domestic political legitimacy supposedly defined by the ideology.

The ideology also provided solid guidelines for the Soviet national strategy. Because of the Soviet ideology, the USSR could not accept the Western concept of stability between East and West. [Ref.6:p.143] The Soviet world view required the rewriting of history to show a continual struggle in keeping with the Marxist-Leninist ideology. The Soviet idea of progression towards stability (i.e., world communism) required the defeat of the existing order. The Soviet language of war did not begin, as in the United States, with a breach of legality nor end with military defeat. It began with the exacerbation of class warfare and ended with the transformation of society. [Ref.18:p.31]

The USSR was not committed to maintaining international order but to guarding the process of transition from the present order to socialism. [Ref.6:p.20] The end result was a different way of looking at the force structure requirements and the role of nuclear weapons. William Odom contends that the Soviets looked at political needs, then at the technological capabilities available and the potential strengths of adversaries, including the United States. [Ref.34:p.131] Gouré adds that the Soviet development of defense policy was not the result of an action-reaction process with the United States as thought by many U.S. policymakers. Rather, it was made upon a supposedly scientific base of Marxist-Leninist tenets which incorporated available technological capabilities. The USSR attempted to

anticipate not only its own military needs but also potential changes in the policies, doctrines, strategies and capabilities of potential opponents. [Ref.7:p.4]

### **3. National Security Strategy**

A body of Marxist-Leninist thought concerning both military science and doctrine was ingrained into both the Soviet officer corps and the party leadership. [Ref.34:p.116] This common point of reference between the political and military establishments provided a mechanism for promoting unity in effort which was probably effective in the early decades of the USSR, and much less so in the 1970s and 1980s. The new post-Soviet Russia has yet to define agreed ideological foundations for unity in national security policy efforts.

The Soviet body of thought also gave the military and political leadership a system to deal with practical military problems such as the kinds and numbers of weapons and forces to be used. This led to the growth of "tough-minded, empirically-grounded, military professionalism," which is still in existence today. [Ref.34:p.116] The primacy of military forces in Soviet economic development should be kept in mind since many of the institutional structures have not yet changed. [Ref.34:p.118]

The principles of Marxist-Leninist ideology encouraged Soviet leaders to believe in victory, even in nuclear war. The USSR could not deprive nuclear war of strategic meaning or else it would have meant that the most basic processes of history (thus the basis of Soviet ideology and political legitimacy) could be derailed by technology and a whim of an "historically doomed

opponent." [Ref.23:p.144] The Soviet dialectic could never allow the country to rest, implying a constant struggle until the achievement of victory throughout the world for communism. This led to a concept of fluid borders, frequent wars, and ever-changing definitions. Stability in the Western sense was never possible. [Ref.18:p.45]

"Enemies [were] inherent in the language of Soviet politics and [were] one of the dynamics of Soviet society" because the dangers posed by "enemies" provided the means to mobilize the people, organize the military, and construct the economy to support the military. [Ref.18:p.29] Russia still considers itself surrounded by potential enemies, but these have had to be redefined on a new ideological basis, owing to the failure of the Marxist-Leninist ideology. Because it no longer has to call for a continual revolution, Russia might be amenable to accepting the Western concept of strategic stability. However, Russia is no longer faced with just the United States, Britain, France, and China as nuclear powers and potential adversaries. The Cold War "balance" has been altered by the retention (at least for a time) of nuclear weapons in other former Soviet republics (Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan) and the acquisition of nuclear and missile technologies by Third World neighbors which Russia must also deal with.

Gray has suggested that the Soviets might have started a war not because of a "window of opportunity" but rather for fear for the political integrity of the Soviet empire. [Ref.6:p.88] Gray adds that a "careful study of Soviet phenomena suggests very strongly that the most deterring prospect in Soviet eyes

[was] the anticipation of military defeat" which would have threatened the government's ability to sustain political control at home. [Ref.6:p.113] The USSR was already in a continual state of war-like levels of social mobilization and the people had long since developed a sort of siege mentality. Some observers hold that the USSR's main concern was for Russia and the extension, through the migration of ethnic Russians and the policy of Russification, of Russia into the other republics. Others argue that the primary concern of the USSR was the survival and comfort of those in power. In 1991-1992, Moscow was willing to allow the other republics independence as long as the Russian state's integrity was maintained, thus allowing those in power to be retained. If this had been threatened, a war might have been possible.

#### **4. Decision-Making Structures**

The over 70 years of Soviet military activity produced a pattern. Military and political leaders recognized that the USSR's military capabilities were limited by objective conditions. William Odom summarizes the following conditions: 1) a manpower base with a low technical-cultural level; 2) an industrial base inadequate for modern technology and weapons, both qualitatively and quantitatively; and 3) the emergence of several new technologies changing the nature of modern weapons, which could lead to a new military doctrine. [Ref.34:p.118] The fall of the Soviet Union will undoubtedly have little effect on the last condition. However, if they could be achieved (which is debatable at present), improvements in the first two conditions would have a significant

impact on Russian strategic culture, especially in the areas of defense, political structure, and international standing.

In the USSR the power was clearly held by the KGB, the Armed Forces, the military-industrial complex, the state bureaucracy and the Communist Party apparatus. Except for the demise of the Communist Party and the renaming of some organizations, the old Soviet structures and elites were essentially still in place in the new Russia as of 1992. [Ref.39:p.1] However, these institutions grew accustomed to great autonomy and, for the most part, unlimited budget support within the Soviet regime, and now the central supervision provided by the Communist Party is no longer existent. The military and internal security institutions do not feel the same degree of obligation to defer to the new central civilian leadership nor do they desire civil disorder.

Moscow does not appear to have the same unquestioned centralized control, as during the Soviet period, because power is becoming more diffused to regional authorities. This could lead to confused or divided allegiances on the part of the military and other security services if an internal crisis were to erupt. Moscow may be forced to reconfigure its domestic political structure if such developments continue in order to preserve its historical status as the center of government in Russia. The impact of such changes on Russian strategic culture, though indeterminant, would be significant.

## **5. Conclusion**

Though by no means a complete assessment, some of the main characteristics and determinants of Russian strategic culture are outlined in Table 2-2. This should at least provide a framework within which to examine the development of Russian BMD strategy in the next chapter.

Russian strategic culture is encountering a perception of heightened insecurity on the regional level, which is resulting in an increasing reliance on nuclear weapons to meet national security needs. This perception is reinforced by the disintegration of the Russian economic infrastructure which traditionally supported the military's requirements. In order to confront the increasingly intense competition for economic resources and new technology, Russia may be forced to rely on Western aid until Moscow considers itself relatively self-sufficient. The role of the informed public in the strategic decision-making process remains limited. However, as non-traditional demands upon the government continue, the public's influence may grow.

In assessing Russian strategic culture, it is apparent that the Soviet experience did have significant impact. Faced with major changes in its international status, domestic political-military arrangements, and scope of national security threats, Russian strategic culture is nonetheless moving beyond the old Soviet culture.

**Table 2-2**

**RUSSIAN STRATEGIC CULTURE**

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- No equivalent to the U.S. preoccupation with the rule of law and constitutional order
  - Centralized government
  - Military desire for internal stability, given non-Russian borderlands under Moscow's control
  - International prestige and superpower status consistently sought via military means
  - Underdeveloped lines of communication requiring semi-autonomous, forward military deployments
  - Militarization of society retains preparedness of the "rear" for military operations--both internal and abroad
  - Military/Political dominance of strategy-making--continued importance of warfighting, war-winning and damage-limitation capabilities
  - Enemies remain inherent; xenophobia persists with fear of (further) loss of territory and internal fragmentation
  - Population will sacrifice for the state
-



### **III. BMD POLICY DEVELOPMENT**

This chapter examines the historical development of U.S. and Russian BMD policy within the context of their respective strategic cultures as defined in the previous chapter. This chapter is divided into two sections. The first focuses on U.S. BMD policy, while the second discusses the evolution of Russian BMD policy. Each section concludes with its findings.

#### **A. U.S. BMD POLICY**

This section examines the development of U.S. BMD policy within the context of U.S. strategic culture. As U.S. BMD policy developed, it may have been influenced by one or more of the strategic cultural determinants identified in the previous chapter. The extent that these determinants may have affected the development of U.S. BMD policy is assessed.

##### **1. Background**

Since Germany launched its V-2s in 1944, the United States has sought defenses against missiles. The pursuit of such defenses has been affected by very diverse factors, from governmental organization to compliance with nuclear strategy and from public opinion to technological feasibility. Consequently, BMD strategy has led a turbulent life within the United States. Not until the mid-1950s, after the USSR had demonstrated the extent of its nuclear and missile capability, did the United States begin a serious effort in BMD development. However, this

initial decision to pursue ABM systems was not so much the result of a national strategy as it was the product of inter-service rivalry, especially between the U.S. Army and the fledgling U.S. Air Force, competing over funding and roles and missions. [Ref.13:pp.11-14] The development of a strategy for ballistic missile defenses since then has depended heavily on the prevailing nuclear strategy.

One of the major effects of the development of intercontinental ballistic missiles was that the United States was no longer guaranteed the ability to stand aloof from wars in Europe and Asia. In fact, as the only nuclear power at the end of World War II, the United States chose to guarantee its involvement in virtually any future war in Europe, especially after the establishment of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). U.S. BMD policy was to be heavily influenced by European alliance considerations. [Ref.17:pp.5-6] NATO was an "entangling alliance" and therefore a break with one of the fundamental traditions of U.S. strategic culture--belief in safety as a norm built upon U.S. geographical isolation.

The idea of developing a defense against ballistic missiles would be consistent with an overall effort to reestablish the integrity of the condition of safety and geographic insularity. This is not to say that these are the only reasons for developing a BMD system. However, other factors, such as the perceptions of security, stability, and technological capability, did not allow this effort to proceed in a straightforward fashion.

The first controversial issues concerned the technical feasibility and the political and strategic desirability of such a capability. As it happens, over 40

years later the debate still rages. With the exception of one deployment in 1975, SAFEGUARD, which was dismantled shortly afterwards, U.S. strategic ballistic missile defenses have not grown out of the R&D stage. The fact that such debates have concerned a defensive system seems at first glance to be contrary to the moral basis of America's strategic culture. These debates have centered not on whether the United States should be made safe but on how. By the late 1950s U.S. strategic thinking became dominated by the concepts of deterrence and containment. [Ref.13:p.8] The debates have also included questions about the viability and credibility of U.S. nuclear strategy. In contrast with the USSR, the issues have not been contained within the circle of political-military elites. The American democratic process actually encourages discussion of the issues among legislative, foreign policy and technical experts and also the general public. The result has been the generation of many different viewpoints.

## **2. Nuclear-Age Strategy**

Gray identifies three new strategies in the post-World War II era which represented innovations in American strategic culture. The first strategy was the deterrence theory. This required a near-constant state of military readiness during peacetime, and ran counter to America's earlier practice of being unprepared for war, suffering initial setbacks, mobilizing and then eventually realizing victory. [Ref.6:p.47] On the other hand, second-strike concepts of deterrence were consistent with this strategic cultural characteristic, since deterrence depended mainly on the ability of the United States to absorb a Soviet

first-strike and then be able to retaliate. [Ref.4:p.68] It also recognized that America could no longer play its traditional isolationist role in world affairs.

The second strategy was the limited war theory, which required readiness to use limited quantities and types of force for limited political goals. No longer was unconditional surrender seen as a viable goal for victory. [Ref.6:p.48]

Arms control theory was the third strategy. Here Gray asserts that the normally ethical United States found merit in some level of collaboration with a potential enemy. [Ref.6:p.48] Rather than collaboration, however, this might be considered a manifestation of the traditional U.S. belief that eventually adversaries will think like Americans, if they do not already do so. It also demonstrates the American tendency to place even international conflict situations on a technical problem-solving level, while assuming that all actors will maintain adherence to the rule of law to the same degree.

### **3. Strategic Stability**

In addition to the above strategies, in the mid-1960s the United States adopted the theory of strategic stability. This was an attempt by the United States to reduce the risk of nuclear war by means of managing and controlling the nuclear arms competition. This theory was formulated when it was realized that the USSR was approaching strategic parity with the United States. Fred Iklé was critical of this theory, which was based on the Western concept of mutual vulnerability. [Ref.28:p.810] According to Iklé, from the mid-1960s to the early

1970s the United States allowed this theory to distort its intelligence projections for Soviet nuclear forces, justifying this on the basis that, in view of U.S. self-restraint, the USSR would not want to overtake America or even to seek a counterforce capability. [Ref.28:p.813] This is a prime illustration of the dangers of ethnocentric thinking within a nation's strategy-making mechanisms.

Strategic stability in the United States has come to mean "a condition in which incentives inherent in the arms balance to initiate the use of strategic nuclear forces and, closely related, to acquire new or additional forces are weak or absent." [Ref.23:p.145] The means to create this condition fall within the theories of nuclear conflict limitation, such as intra-war deterrence, flexible response, and no first use. These theories use concepts of risk management and bargaining with the opponent and are contrary to traditional definitions of achieving victory. [Ref.23:p.148] Gray suggests that a mutual-vulnerability theory of strategic stability was adopted by the United States in the mid-1960s, possibly as a result of McNamara's judgement that the East-West arms competition could be stabilized through cooperative management based on bargaining. [Ref.6:p.136] This is illustrative of how the U.S. national security process was affected by the adoption of a managerial-style leadership. According to McNamara, "it made no sense to invest in defenses in the mid-1960s because a better return on the dollar could be had by enhancing the ability of offensive forces to penetrate enemy defenses, thereby ensuring deterrence through assured destruction." [Ref.13:pp.23-

24] This also demonstrates the extent to which military and international affairs have been converted to problem-solving sets and handled as such by U.S. elites.

Further evidence of the distortion of U.S. intelligence projections is provided by a recently declassified study<sup>1</sup> of the U.S. National Intelligence Estimate process in the 1970's. In order to better judge U.S. intelligence estimates regarding the Soviets, President Gerald Ford ordered the Director of Central Intelligence, George Bush, to establish an independent intelligence review group. In June 1976 Team B, as the group was called, began its work. The group included experts from within and outside the government. Some insiders were Maj.Gen. George Keegan, USAF, and Paul Wolfowitz. Outsiders included Richard Pipes (the Team B leader), Paul Nitze, Daniel Graham, and William Van Cleave. The report concluded that the Americans and the Soviets held different views of strategic nuclear war and that the Soviets did not appear to accept the U.S. theory of strategic stability. The report concluded that

the scope and vigor of Soviet programs, supported by identifiable doctrinal imperatives, leave little reasonable doubt that Soviet leaders are determined to achieve the maximum attainable measure of strategic superiority over the U.S....which is unrestrained by concepts of "how much is enough?"; and which is measured not in Western assured destruction terms but rather in terms of war-fighting objectives of achieving post-war dominance and limiting damage to the maximum extent possible. [Ref.52:p.46]

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<sup>1</sup> Report by Team "B" on "Intelligence Community Experiment in Competitive Analysis" generously provided by Donald Baucom, BMDO Historian.

"Team B's conclusions were reflected in the new National Intelligence Estimate of Soviet Strategic Capabilities and Objectives...It became the generally accepted national estimate of what the United States faced when Jimmy Carter became president." [Ref.13:pp.81-82] This undoubtedly was a factor in Carter's decision to begin building up U.S. military capabilities just before the end of his administration.

A theory of stable deterrence and its rationale for a finite need of weapons support the U.S. and Western belief that peacetime defense preparation has a negative impact on society, not to mention the wasting of scarce resources. [Ref.6:p.142] Iklé argued that it was not the destructiveness of a particular technology (i.e., nuclear weapons), but the capriciousness of both technological developments and of America's strategic thought which led to an overemphasis on retaliation and to the neglect of defenses in the U.S. strategic posture. He believed it "reflect[ed] not a state of nature but a state of mind." [Ref.28:p.812] Rather than "a state of mind," others, such as McGeorge Bundy, Sidney Drell and William J. Crowe, Jr., still regard mutual vulnerability as "a state of physics." "There is really no present prospect that all-out defense can outrun all-out offense in nuclear warfare...." [Ref.21:p.151]

The result of the stalemate between these U.S. schools of thought has been several deficiencies within the U.S. deterrence capability: 1) limited hard-target counterforce capability; 2) non-robust C<sup>3</sup>I system; 3) minimal civil defenses and no homeland military defenses; 4) nonexistent post-war recovery or industrial

mobilization plans; 5) extremely limited strategic reconstitution capability; and 6) no conceptualization of political aims in war or post-war order, owing to the emphasis on pre-war deterrence. [Ref.6:p.145] Critics argued that the conceptual belief in a viable U.S. deterrent force was not actually supported by the requisite operational strategies, force structures and national security staff.

The theory of strategic stability reflected the attitudes of the political-military elites of the 1960s and 1970s. These attitudes included the belief that strategic superiority could not be regained. However, such superiority was not seen as necessary for the current nuclear strategy. A continued doctrinal commitment to superiority would have allowed the military services to request larger forces at will, though these were deemed by the governing political elites to have no real military or political benefit. "The primary purpose of the Assured Destruction capabilities doctrine was to provide a metric for deciding how much force was enough: it provided a basis for denying Service and Congressional claims for more money for strategic forces." [Ref.49:p.146] The evolution of technology was considered to be at an impasse, also. An associated belief was that, whatever the U.S. efforts, the Soviets would effectively counter them anyway. [Ref.6:p.50]

#### **4. Technological Issues**

As stated above, the development of ballistic missile defense systems and policy was strongly tied to the overriding nuclear strategies. Up until the mid-1960s deployment of BMD systems was not undertaken. Reasons for this



decision included opposition by the Administration, based on the technical inadequacy of such systems at that time, and economic considerations.  
[Ref.13:pp.19-20]

Technological breakthroughs ultimately made such a deployment possible. However, the Administration remained concerned about the risk of destabilizing relations with the USSR in light of the recent moves towards *detente* after the 1962 Cuban Missile crisis. The White House and Defense Department were also concerned about the enormous costs of deploying a BMD system capable of being effective against a massive Soviet strike. In addition, improvements in guidance, tracking, targeting and conventional munitions offered the possibility of deploying conventional interceptors instead of the nuclear-armed interceptors that were increasingly politically unacceptable by the late 1970s.  
[Ref.45:p.53]

## **5. Public Involvement**

Unlike in the USSR, public debate and involvement in national issues is encouraged in the United States. The debates surrounding BMD were no exception. Expert opinion was fundamental in preventing the deployment of nuclear-armed defenses, SENTINEL, equivalent to the operational Soviet system.  
[Ref.1:p.246] Support and opposition for BMD were generated from multiple sources, e.g., the scientific community, current and former government and military officials, academia and university students, and concerned interest groups. The academic-scientific community used the 1969 ABM debate to express

negative sentiment about "U.S. defense policies from Vietnam and cost overruns to what they perceived as a nuclear arms race." [Ref.13:p.42] Donald Baucom identifies four international events which may have been instrumental in further defining the BMD debate. These events were: 1) China's 1964 nuclear explosion, 2) Chinese testing of nuclear missiles, 3) China's second nuclear explosion, and 4) Soviet construction of an ABM system. [Ref.13:p.27]

Exemplary of the degree the public is involved in U.S. national security affairs was the MX-basing issue. The MX (later known as the PEACEKEEPER) was to replace the MINUTEMAN ICBMs. This debate not only went nation-wide on television, but each state considered for basing was allowed to review the Defense Department and Service studies pertaining to the impact of the basing on the economy, the environment and society. [Ref.13:p.175] The MX issue would have to be resolved before any decision could be made concerning a BMD deployment.

## 6. Arms Control

In order to deploy a BMD system and not irritate the Soviets, the deployment was to be presented as protection against the slowly emerging Chinese nuclear threat. China exploded its first nuclear device in 1964. The system would not be effective against a sophisticated Soviet attack, but would provide a "thin defense" against the limited nuclear forces of China. [Ref.1:p.242] This decision demonstrated the ongoing struggle for resources within the government and the fact that active strategic defenses were not given high

priority despite their moral appeal, in large part due to the higher priority given to the Vietnam War then in progress. [Ref.13:p.25] Another reason for not deploying BMD at that time was the arms-control process, which was assumed to be actually working; it was argued that a BMD system would have derailed past progress. [Ref.1:p.244] Some believed that a U.S. deployment of an ABM system would provoke the Soviets into further pursuing multiple independently-targeted reentry vehicle (MIRV) technology to counter such efforts.

The signing of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty was seen by the international community as the capstone of U.S.-USSR *detente* and arms-control policy. Expert commentary concerning the event varied. Some observers argued that arms control, in general, constrained U.S. options while the Soviets went ahead with their agenda. Some, such as William Van Cleave, judged that U.S. policymakers were more concerned with limiting damage to the USSR than their own country. [Ref.42:p.36] Gray maintained that without a damage-limitation capability (i.e., BMD), the United States could not have a credible deterrence policy and in reality was left with a nuclear "self-deterrence" policy. [Ref.6:p.119] Henry Kissinger contended "that the absence of a strong ABM system removed a major incentive for [the Soviet deployment of] MIRVed ICBMs." [Ref.13:p.75] The signing of the ABM Treaty was thought by many in the United States to have codified Soviet acceptance of strategic stability by maintaining mutual vulnerability. Nevertheless, subsequent events called this interpretation into question.

The 1970s witnessed the Soviets gaining what appeared to some U.S. experts to be a first-strike capability. Intensification of the debates over MX-basing and BMD issues ensued. Furthermore, questions then arose as to Soviet intentions considering the apparent disregard for complying with treaties. In 1974-1975 a breakdown in U.S.-Soviet relations began, particularly exacerbated by Soviet MIRVing of new ICBMs, Soviet renouncement of a trade agreement with the United States, Soviet support of North Vietnam's invasion of South Vietnam, and evidence of Soviet violations of SALT I. In the late 1970s the Soviets openly increased strategic offensive forces and in 1979 invaded Afghanistan. [Ref.13:pp.75-75] Congressional attitudes toward BMD by this time began to shift, allowing increased efforts in deployment and prototype work. [Ref.45:p.29]

Congress at first attempted to keep the United States within the strictest interpretation of the ABM Treaty and severely restricted funding for normal offensive force modernization and BMD R&D. These attitudes demonstrated the effect that international events, e.g., the Vietnam War and its political aftermath, were having on the government. It was also a time when Congress was attempting to reassert its influence in international affairs and military issues, areas that had been previously considered the executive branch's domain. [Ref.1:p.203] But by the end of the 1970s it was obvious that the USSR had not restrained its own strategic force activity and Congress finally permitted the United States to proceed. [Ref.28:p.814]

Only one ABM site, SAFEGUARD, was actually deployed for missile defense by 1975 in accordance with the 1974 amendment to the ABM Treaty. Nonetheless, by 1976 its dismantlement had begun. Congressional reasoning for killing SAFEGUARD was based on Soviet MIRVing of ICBMs which apparently nullified any ABM capability. [Ref.13:p.97] Those against BMD had feared a defensive arms race with the USSR, assuming erroneously that the Soviets always followed a U.S. lead. [Ref.28:p.815] Some critics saw the deployment of BMD around missiles as iniquitous, since civilian populations were left unprotected. In general, most Americans favored arms control talks but did not want the United States to be placed at a disadvantage. American attitudes toward BMD began to be more sharply defined as a result of certain international events in 1979-1982, including the fall of the Shah of Iran and the Iranian hostage crisis; the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan; and the East-West confrontations over the positioning of intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) and ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs) in Europe. [Ref.13:p.182] The result was to be a renewed emphasis on BMD.

When President Reagan took office, the nation still had no consensus on the MX-basing issue. U.S. strategic defenses were limited to: 1) early warning, 2) surveillance, 3) token control of U.S. airspace, and 4) a reserve force able only to hold off small-scale bomber and cruise missile attacks. [Ref.4:pp.68-69] Reagan was personally distressed with the lack of U.S. defensive capability and embarked on an intense campaign to rectify this situation. The basic political statement to

the Soviets was that the United States desired to stay within ABM Treaty limitations but had to respond to the growth in Soviet strategic capabilities, possibly by using high-technology--an area of Soviet weakness. [Ref.13:p.179]

## **7. Strategic Defense Initiative**

In 1983 U.S. President Ronald Reagan announced the new Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) and in 1991 U.S. President George Bush announced the scaled-down version known as Global Protection Against Limited Strikes (GPALS). Both programs were (and are) subjects of heated debates. Until the SDI, the United States had had no robust BMD R&D programs since the SAFEGUARD site was dismantled in 1976.

The establishment of SDI reflected many of America's strategic cultural characteristics. It was to fill the immoral void left by the lack of strategic defenses. Second, it fit well into Reagan's plan of breaking the Soviet Union via economic means, a traditional American strength. The GPALS version of SDI envisaged a more realistic system for near-term deployment, while not stressing America's economic resources as much.

Despite the great extent and public nature of the nuclear and strategic defense debate, "in 1985 only about one-third of the public had heard about the ABM/SALT I treaty...Approximately 75 percent of the public...[held] the (inaccurate) belief that the United States...[had] a fairly effective defense against nuclear weapons. Most people...[were] satisfied with our (non-existent) defense against nuclear attack." [Ref.5:pp.1-3] These attitudes are consistent with

America's traditional strategic cultural characteristic, the condition of relative safety as a norm, resulting from the isolated U.S. geostrategic position.

## **8. Conclusion**

The events of the 1990s to date have shaken the traditional tenets of national security planners. The Gulf War changed the focus of U.S. BMD efforts from a strategic level to a theater level of development. The dissolution of the USSR in 1991 has had several consequences. First, it fundamentally altered (or even, some would argue, eliminated) the central threat to the United States while at the same time multiplying (at least temporarily) the number of nuclear weapons states. Second, the validity of past treaties, e.g., the ABM Treaty, and of recent arms control agreements with Moscow, e.g., the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) accords, has been questioned by some in both Russia and the United States, in addition to the newly independent republics of Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan. Third, the United States has unilaterally declared cuts in its strategic nuclear forces beyond those required by START I. Fourth, in 1992 Russian President Boris Yeltsin and U.S. President George Bush discussed the possibility of joint U.S.-Russian BMD development. [Ref.41] And finally, the United States elected in November 1992 a new president who has yet to formulate a detailed national security strategy.

The United States is technologically superior to the former Soviet Union (FSU). If the United States wanted to do so, it could deploy some sort of space-based BMD well before Moscow could. However, the obstacles to such a

deployment for the United States are political rather than technological. Each new administration may lose more of the determination initiated by Reagan in 1983. The Moscow of the 1980s, though lacking technological capability equivalent to that of the United States, once politically committed, could have sustained its efforts and deployed a system, whether or not 100 percent effective, before the United States did so. [Ref.10:p.87]

This was not, of course, the same Moscow that the United States will be facing for the rest of this century and early into the next. Though noted in the context of "technical skepticism" about Soviet BMD capability, it has become part of U.S. "strategic-cultural" thinking to assume that America has the ability to catch up technologically and/or quantitatively with any other country's capabilities by using American technical and economic assets, given political will. [Ref.16:p.66] This assumption that the United States can always catch up tends to make it difficult to formulate, implement and adhere to long-term strategies. Another enduring feature of American strategic culture is the high regard for the law. The future of U.S. BMD efforts will be heavily dependent on the status of the ABM Treaty and other arms control treaties.

## **B. RUSSIAN BMD POLICY--DEVELOPMENT**

Russian BMD policy may have been influenced by one or more of the strategic cultural determinants identified in the previous chapter. This section



explores the development of Soviet, then Russian, BMD policy within the context of Russian strategic culture.

### **1. Background**

As in the United States, the development of BMD in the USSR began shortly after the development of ballistic missiles. The Soviet BMD system was just one part of an extensive air defense system, which included surface-to-air missiles and aircraft interceptors, designed to protect the Soviet homeland.

The Soviets developed their first BMD components in the mid-1950s and by the early 1960s began constructing a BMD ring near Leningrad (renamed Sankt Petersburg in 1991). A while later a system was built around Moscow. During the 1960s the Soviets did not publicly acknowledge the possibility of a strategic defense arms race. Prime Minister Kosygin said the ABM system was defensive for the purpose of protecting people. At that time Kosygin and others presumed that an arms race could only occur with offensive systems. [Ref.10:p.25]

The question is why Soviet BMD policy formed as it did, leaving Russia with only one operational BMD site around Moscow. It is hoped that the study of Russian strategic culture will help to clarify this.

Whereas in the United States, BMD policy has been closely tied to the prevailing nuclear strategy and subject to scrutiny by the informed public, this was not the case in the USSR. Public opinion in the USSR was not a factor in policy formulation as a result of the highly centralized decision-making process which only involved the upper political and military echelons. [Ref.23:p.143]

Once made, decisions were executed from the top-down and resources were allocated with few objections. There was also no real public reaction or protest to the deployment of nuclear-tipped interceptors in the Moscow ABM site.

## **2. Strategic Defense Requirements**

David Yost identifies three requirements of Soviet military doctrine which demanded strategic defense capabilities. First was the ability to dissuade Europe and the United States from using nuclear weapons. If this was not possible, then the attempt was to be made to limit the use of nuclear weapons and prevent the extension of the geographical scope and intensity of nuclear operations. [Ref.17:p.110] As for being tied to the nuclear strategy, by the mid-to late-1950s the Soviet General Staff had incorporated nuclear weapons into its war-fighting art, denying that nuclear weapons "effected a historical discontinuity in the utility...of the resort to force." [Ref.6:p.68] Unlike the United States, which has had three different strategies, i.e., nuclear deterrence, air-land battle, and maritime strategy, the Soviets developed both offensive and defensive forces, including nuclear, to work in a single combined-arms approach. [Ref.34:p.123] Nuclear weapons were fully integrated into the Soviet concept of operations and political-military strategies. [Ref.17:p.73]

The second and third requirements reflected Moscow's preference for conventional means of war. Strategic defenses would help limit nuclear effects against Warsaw Pact forces plus protect against any retaliatory strikes in response to the Soviet use of nuclear weapons. [Ref.17:pp.112-114] The above requirements

for the Soviet military doctrine reflected not only a long-term military strategy, but also the need for long-term and intensive political and diplomatic efforts as well. The centralized policy-making process and single ideology enabled the Soviets to strive for long-term goals.

### **3. Nuclear Strategy**

Gray notes the impact of some elements of strategic culture on Soviet nuclear strategy. First, the Soviet ideology identified the enemy, i.e., all non-socialist countries. Second, Soviet strategy disallowed any substitute for victory in war. Third, it was the politician's duty to deter war, while the military's duty was to prepare for the conduct of war. [Ref.6:p.88]

Fourth is the very important factor that war should be survivable and, therefore, required damage-limitation capabilities, e.g., BMD. The issue of survivability is discussed in more detail below. Fifth, the USSR did not expect a nuclear war to be cheap and appeared ready to pay the cost. [Ref.6:p.88]

Finally, there was only one source of military science, the General Staff, which viewed war as fighting, not bargaining. [Ref.6:p.88] These considerations illustrate key differences in Soviet and U.S. thinking.

### **4. National Security Strategy**

Soviet strategic doctrine dictated that Soviet strategic forces strive in all available ways to enhance the prospect that the USSR could survive a war, while concurrent efforts were to be made to defeat the main enemy, should deterrence fail, in some politically and militarily meaningful way. With a less advanced

economy, the USSR could not rely as heavily on technological solutions to security problems as could the United States. The pursuit of these goals was intended to help deter or prevent nuclear war while simultaneously attaining other strategic and foreign policy objectives. [Ref.23:p.139] This doctrine enabled both political and military institutions to work towards a common goal. The Communist Party of the Soviet Union appeared to be more concerned with the survival of essential state assets than with the survival of the people. [Ref.6:p.xii] However, evidence exists that the previous Communist-driven unity in effort has begun to fracture profoundly with the increasing competition for scarce resources and political control within Russia.

Because of its requirement for survivability, the USSR was never able to accept the Western concepts of strategic stability and mutual vulnerability. Nonetheless, many saw the signing of the 1972 ABM Treaty as an indication of Soviet acceptance of these concepts. [Ref.10:p.84] Others viewed the treaty as a means for the Soviets to catch up with the United States, while limiting U.S. progress. [Ref.23:p.146] The Soviets may have agreed to limitations in the Treaty because of U.S. technological superiority at that time in BMD. However, Moscow needed to retain some capability to develop BMD not only against the United States but also China. The United States had its own theory of mutual vulnerability as a basis for strategic stability, and some argue that this theory was used against the United States to the USSR's advantage. [Ref.17:p.100] Despite the ABM Treaty and U.S. claims for strategic stability through mutual

vulnerability, Soviet political and military leaders made every effort to reduce their vulnerability. [Ref.28:p.814]

### 5. Technological Issues

Moscow, like Washington, has had its BMD programs and policies affected by political, economic and technological limitations. In the late 1960s Soviet attitudes towards BMD and superpower relations began to change. The Soviets were near nuclear parity and chose to use the Western notion of strategic stability through mutual vulnerability to gain U.S. approval of the BMD limitations codified in the ABM Treaty. [Ref.10:p.26] This change in the Soviet view towards BMD and the arms race also reflected the USSR's growing economic and technological constraints.

In the early 1960s the USSR was still optimistic about the technological feasibility of a BMD system, especially considering the success of the *Sputnik* mission. [Ref.10:p.26] However, by the end of the decade critics claimed that BMD systems were not as technically feasible and effective as initially thought. Claims of 100 percent effectiveness stopped and only four of the original eight BMD complexes around Moscow were completed. [Ref.10:p.30] Growing Soviet doubts about the desirability of deploying a defensive system that would not be 100 percent effective began to correlate more with U.S. rationales for non-deployment based on budgetary and technological concerns.

Soviet systems were nonetheless deployed even if flawed and followed the practice of incremental modernization typical of the Soviet regime. Prompt

operational applications took priority over optimal effectiveness. [Ref.17:p.26] The Soviet BMD system signified a steady, measured commitment to deploy available technology in compliance with the ABM Treaty. [Ref.16:p.53]

## 6. Arms Control

After a decade of rapid Soviet military expansion, around 1974 spending had to be reprioritized according to Leonid Brezhnev's assessment that the USSR was more secure and the economic situation was worsening. Brezhnev resisted attempts by the defense ministry to increase military spending, much to its chagrin. In order to relieve the internal pressures, Brezhnev called on the international community to slow the arms race. [Ref.10:pp.46-48] Not by chance was an amendment made to the ABM Treaty in 1974 which reduced the number of allowable ABM sites to one.

The SALT agreements of the 1970s were based on the theories about strategic implications of existing armaments whose military capabilities were reasonably understood, whereas, future capabilities of weapons, such as space-based BMD systems, are subject to speculation. Bruce Parrott believes that the Washington confused the Soviets by contradicting strategic concepts the United States had advocated in the mid-1970s (i.e., strategic stability through mutual vulnerability). [Ref.10:p.84] The contradiction Parrott refers to was the announcement in 1983 of SDI plus the U.S. military build-up. The Soviets had concluded the arms-control agreements of the 1970s as a way to codify Soviet gains, to reduce the likelihood of a U.S. military build-up and to permit the

slowing of the Soviet military's growth in light of economic constraints.  
[Ref.10:p.10]

The USSR grew increasingly concerned when the U.S. SDI program was announced and Moscow feared a U.S. "breakout" from the ABM Treaty. The Soviets since 1972 the 1960s had tied adherence to offensive arms-control agreements with compliance with the ABM Treaty. Since 1972 the Soviets had considered commitment to the ABM Treaty more important than a full-scale BMD deployment in order to limit U.S. progress. [Ref.16:p.22] For example, the 1986 Reykjavik summit saw the relinkage of the continuation of negotiations for the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty (which was signed in December 1987) with limitations on SDI. [Ref.10:p.67] Remaining within the ABM Treaty limitations allowed scarce Soviet resources to be used elsewhere while concurrently restraining U.S. BMD opportunities. The Soviets were able to use the American propensity to abide by laws, both national and international, to their advantage. Moscow has used the Defense and Space Talks to gain U.S. assurances about compliance with the ABM Treaty. [Ref.16:p.53]

## 7. Conclusion

Moscow's strategic planners have been obsessed with the initial period of war because it is seen as decisive for the final outcome. The General Staff wanted to dominate this period by achieving a radical shift in the correlation of forces in their favor. [Ref.10:p.162] At present, with no BMD system in the United States, limited strategic targeting could have prevented the United States from

projecting its forces to Europe on the NATO schedule. This would have a tremendous impact on the initial period of the war. However, a BMD deployment, which could protect NATO, would reflect a very different Western psychological attitude towards modern warfare. The concept of mutual vulnerability, assuming near 100 percent BMD effectiveness, could no longer be expected to constrain Western force development. Obviously, the impact on Moscow's political and military leadership and strategy would be dramatic. [Ref.10:pp.172-173]

Soviet ideology and Russian history would appear to have dictated the need for a more robust strategic BMD system than was actually deployed, assuming that the survival of the core political-military leadership was of paramount importance. Russia will undoubtedly retain this belief well into the next century. Even if Russia were to fragment further, the new political entities would probably also operate under this premise of survival priorities, at least in the near term.

Keeping the above in mind and recognizing Moscow's comprehensive approach to strategy, the importance given to strategic defense as a whole can be appreciated. However, in view of continuing economic and technological constraints, Moscow has had to rely on other strategic defense elements, instead of BMD, in order to achieve its goals. The low level of BMD deployments should not be seen as an indication of a lack of interest in strategic defense.



#### **IV. ANALYSIS OF U.S.-RUSSIAN BMD POLICY**

So far the strategic culture (Chapter II) and BMD policy development (Chapter III) of the United States and Russia have been examined from similar analytical perspectives. Where has this research led? What have been identified as the overriding differences in the U.S. and Russian strategic cultures? What are their priorities and preoccupations? This chapter intends to answer these questions to furnish a basis for exploring the possible future of U.S. and Russian BMD policies and the ABM Treaty.

##### **A. THE U.S.-RUSSIAN STRATEGIC CULTURAL IMPACT ON BMD POLICY**

The impact of strategic culture on U.S. and Russian BMD policy is examined and compared within broad categories. This should provide a clearer understanding of the unique qualities of each country's strategic culture as it affects its BMD policies, including different concepts of employing BMD.

##### **1. Geostrategic Situation, Threat Perceptions, Technological Culture**

One of the biggest differences between U.S. and Russian strategic culture is based on each country's geostrategic situation. The American perception of distant security dangers has allowed the United States to forego the deployment of a national missile defense (NMD) system until such time as such defenses are deemed necessary, i.e., a new immediate threat. Whereupon the United States will also rely on its high-technology base to produce a NMD

system. Aside from the hardening of missile silos and command sites, and early warning assets (such as NORAD), and limited air defense capabilities, the pursuit of other strategic ballistic missile defense measures is unlikely. In response to new regional threats and the failings of proliferation controls, the United States is pursuing the development of new high-technology theater missile defense (TMD) systems for use in regional contingencies.

In the USSR, as in Russia, a threat to state survival was perceived to exist on all sides. With the experiences of World War II, the USSR saw a clear need for all types of strategic defense, both passive and active. However, technology did not permit the construction of effective national BMD. Russian and Soviet strategic culture did not include as great a reliance on technological solutions to national security problems as has been the case in the United States. Instead, using its geostrategic position, Russia pursued other strategic defense options to include deep underground hardened command facilities, industrial dispersal plans and mobile launchers. Russia is faced with a rapidly degenerating economic and industrial situation and will most likely continue to invest in "low-tech" passive strategic defense measures, despite a perception of more immediate threats along its border as a result of the retention of nuclear missiles by some of the former republics and the proliferation of nuclear and missile technology to some neighboring Third World states. [Ref.56] The desire for high-technology defensive systems, such as Russia saw the United States employ during the Gulf

War, to counter these threats is high, though actual acquisition in the near term would require the assistance of one or more of the advanced industrial countries.

## **2. Rule of Law, Moral Standards/Ideology, Role of the Informed Public**

All of these factors--traditional attitudes about the rule of law and the moral order, upheld by an informed public--to some degree have militated against the United States violating or unilaterally abrogating the ABM Treaty in pursuit of a NMD system. In this regard, the rule of law and the role of the informed public have had the most impact. However, high moral standards have been one of the many factors in defining BMD requirements. Many Americans have argued that, if a BMD system were to be deployed, the effectiveness of such a system must be extremely high for the protection of the population.

The establishment of an ABM Treaty Compliance Review Group and the powers held by the U.S. Congress as regards treaties are among the many indications of the important part the above factors play within U.S. national strategy. Additionally, these factors can often be more self-constraining to the United States than to Russia because of American principles of legality. No allegations of U.S. infringements of the ABM Treaty compare with the actual violations publicly acknowledged by Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze (e.g., the Krasnoyarsk radar). These factors suggest that the United States will continue only the R&D stage of its strategic BMD efforts unless: the ABM Treaty can be legally amended to permit more extensive deployments and/or an immediate threat to national security arises requiring a BMD response.

Given the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the USSR, the U.S. general public now feels free to return to its traditional insular view of the world and neglects the realities of the extent of instability within the international system. The overall U.S. reaction to the fall of the USSR could be compared to the reaction of the public to a successful anti-trust lawsuit against a major corporation; the newly independent "spinoff" entities are assumed to proceed in accordance with the law. It is unrealistic to treat international events of this magnitude in such a manner.

The above factors, with the exception of ideology, did not have the same degree of influence on Soviet national strategy and BMD policy. In attempting to meet ideological goals, including state survival, laws were fluid and malleable. This element has been consistently present since Russia's imperial age when the tsar could enact and overturn laws nearly at will to suit the purposes of the state. In this situation, many public laws and moral considerations were subordinated to the needs of the state and, therefore, were not an integral part of strategy-making. Modern Russia must overcome this traditional disregard for the law if it is to successfully achieve progress towards creating a democracy. The subordination of the public to the state probably reached its peak during the Soviet period. Nevertheless, with the changes in Russia the role of the public in defining Russia's national strategy (and BMD policy) may become more important with time. Of course, this means that Russia's national strategy will probably

become more subject to popular political fluctuations, much like American strategy is.

### **3. Military Support, Military Status, Governmental Structure**

The United States historically has not willingly supported a large, standing military force. Nevertheless, the post-World War II international security environment compelled the United States to maintain a large force. Now with the Cold War "won," the United States is again reducing its military. The impact on BMD policy has been dramatic. From a time of virtually no BMD capabilities to Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative with an emphasis on NMD systems, the Clinton Administration has altered the course of U.S. BMD efforts again by shifting priorities from NMD to theater missile defense. The Strategic Defense Initiative Organization (SDIO) has even recently been renamed the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO). [Ref.53] Also indicative of BMD's status change was the fact that the announcement about the BMDO was made by the U.S. Secretary of Defense, Les Aspin, whereas in the previous two administrations (Reagan and Bush) major changes in the SDIO's status were announced personally by the President. The continued changing of priorities portends further uncertainty for BMD's future as national strategy retains its short-term vision.

Though the military services, particularly the U.S. Army and Air Force, have conducted and sponsored extensive BMD R&D, they have not been the main drivers behind BMD policy. Rather, members of the Executive and Legislative

branches of government, arms control advocates, and the scientific community--and the budget--have influenced the support (or lack thereof) for BMD policy. U.S. military strategy is focused on deterrence and, if necessary, war-fighting overseas. The U.S. language of war is centered on escalation control and minimizing U.S. and allied casualties. As scenarios of probable future conflicts have changed, the military has become more supportive of TMD in support of these roles.

In contrast to the United States, Russia (and the USSR) historically has required a large military force to protect the vast expanse of its territory. To the extent possible, almost the entire Soviet population received some sort of military and civil defense training in order to be better prepared to support the armed forces in the next major war effort. Nuclear weapons were integrated into Soviet military doctrine as a means of achieving security goals. Even with the dissolution of the USSR and the end of the Cold War, Russia's national security interests still require large forces. However, the ability to support such a military has been severely degraded by the disintegration of the socialist economy. The Russian government is also no longer able to make demands on the people to the same degree as before. In fact, demands are being placed upon the Russian government by the regions as never before and in many cases the regions are disregarding Moscow's decrees and directives. [Ref.55] In addition, the myth of an invincible army has been shattered. The military is now the subject of a very negative public backlash, partly as a result of the hardships suffered by the

people for the military over the past several decades. Nevertheless, the stability of the government depends upon the relationship with the military as long as the government needs the military's support as the ultimate guarantor of public order. The impact of all this on BMD is that BMD currently does not have a very high priority within the military.

The Soviet military's primary goals were the protection of the Party and military leadership and the main elements of the Soviet control structure. BMD policy has been oriented toward an effective active system centered on preserving the government, as with the GALOSH sites deployed around Moscow, to be capable of carrying on even after a nuclear exchange. Despite military and economic hardships GALOSH remains operational. National strategy is still the purview of the political-military elites, who will probably try to retain its long-term strategic vision as well as events will allow. Russia's language of war remains similar to the old Soviet war-fighting doctrine, while now also emphasizing the need for internal stability and protecting the interests of Russian minorities in former Soviet republics on Russia's periphery. Apparently the military continues to view nuclear weapons as an integral part of its military doctrine. [Ref.54] However, as Russia seeks outside assistance it may try to distance itself further from the old Soviet image and relegate the use of nuclear weapons to extreme and improbable circumstances, in an approach similar to that of the United States. On the other hand, economic weaknesses and shortcomings in conventional military capabilities may lead the Russians to emphasize nuclear

weapons more than during the last phase of the Soviet period. Once Russia establishes a modernized R&D and production capability able to support its military needs, the military may more vigorously pursue BMD, but in the area of mobile ATBMs, and continue efforts in other areas of passive and active strategic defense.

#### **4. Security Perceptions, Reliance on Economy and Technology**

The end of the Cold War has meant a perception of enhanced security for the United States. The threat has shifted from a major central adversary to lesser regional contingencies. The traditional American psychological condition of relative safety has thus been reinforced, whether or not it reflects objective reality. This factor further tempers the development and deployment of strategic BMD systems, though research will continue. In addition, it increases the reliance on U.S. economic and technological capability to develop such systems quickly in a time of crisis. This also assumes that the United States will maintain its economic and technological superiority. Though no strategic BMD systems will be deployed in the near-term, the new threat focus has resulted in a demand for more effective theater-level missile defenses. Passive strategic defenses will probably continue mainly in the realm of technical solutions, e.g., hardening and stealth, rather than civil defense programs.

Russia is faced with a fear that even the Soviet Union wasn't wholly concerned with; that is, the fear of the further loss of territory or the disintegration of Russia proper. Russia's strategic focus has also shifted from a



global perspective to a more regional view. Nevertheless, this "region" is adjacent to its borders, whereas the American regional concerns are far overseas. With a national security threat not only externally more immediate (and nuclear-armed) but also internal, Russia's traditional xenophobia (at least in some important political movements) has been reinforced. A recent Russian report also indicates a heightened threat resulting from the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. [Ref.56] Given the opportunity and ability, and still faced with a missile threat, Russia would strive for a more comprehensive BMD system.

Russia is currently unable, either politically, economically or technologically, to field large-scale BMD systems, though it will try to continue its R&D work. If any system were to be developed and deployed at this time, it would most likely be a mobile TMD system. However, this is very costly as well. Russia will have to rely on "low-tech" or Soviet-era "off the shelf" solutions to its security problems for the near-term or seek Western assistance. This may in part explain Russia's recent inquiry to the United States as to the status of the Global Protection System (GPS). The 1991 U.S. proposal for a GPS grew out of both Reagan's proposal to share U.S. BMD technology with the Soviets and Bush's proposed GPALS. The purpose of GPS would be to shift the basis of the U.S.-Russian relationship from strategic offensive weapons to strategic defense.

## **5. International Status**

Within this century the United States has risen from isolationism to status as a superpower with global interests and responsibilities. The dissolution

of the USSR has left the United States as the only superpower, though not the only nuclear power. The United States has found that its many global commitments prevent it from returning to an isolationist mode. The United States also seems to be operating under the assumption that foreign powers share the strategic interests of the United States, even in cases where they clearly do not. These factors tend to encourage the United States to pursue not only a NMD but also a global BMD system, similar to some versions of Reagan's SDI proposal. This would also be assuming that foreign powers would be better off and willing to have a system under the control of the American "honest broker." This seems to have been one of the assumptions behind the U.S.-proposed Global Protection System. GPS was to include Russia and some of the newly independent republics, in addition to U.S. allies.

GPS would have allowed an opportunity of a different sort for the U.S. role in international politics. It included the notion that the development and deployment of BMD "not only protects vital U.S. interests...but it provides a foundation for positive and enduring improvement in the U.S.-Soviet relationship." [Ref.26:p.10] Though Stephen Hadley, then Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Policy, stated this in 1990, the general philosophy was endorsed until early 1993. This philosophy sought to change the basis of the U.S.-Russian military relationship from offensive strategic weapons to defensive systems. The change from SDI and its "Star Wars" connotations to GPS with its sense of protection signalled a new direction in U.S. strategic

thinking. How far the Clinton Administration will continue this effort is uncertain, especially with the downgrading of BMD's status.

However, with growing regional threats, military drawdowns and economic constraints, the pursuit of a costly system such as GPS is very unlikely. This conclusion is supported by the Clinton Administration's reprioritization of BMD to emphasize TMD first, with strategic BMD a far lower priority. Any further discussions concerning a GPS-type system might therefore be for political purposes, e.g., confidence-building measures, rather than for actual deployment in the foreseeable future. The United States seems to be uncertain about the exact role it should play in the new international environment.

Russia, obviously, is undergoing quite a different experience. Not even Imperial Russia went through such drastic dismantlement, especially without a major conflict, as the Soviet Union experienced in 1991. Though still a major nuclear power, Russia's international standing has been badly shaken, and it has had to curtail many of its global commitments. Unable to militarily reassert itself as a superpower, Russia is relying on diplomatic measures to retain the appearance of power on the international scene. Though Russian President Boris Yeltsin expressed interest in the U.S.-proposed GPS as recently as the 4 April 1993 Vancouver Summit, the domestic political situation prevents Russia from participation if Moscow sees itself as negotiating from a position of weakness.

[Ref.55]

In 1992 Russian Deputy Minister of Defense Pavel Grachev brought up four points concerning a joint BMD system. First, cooperation would only be considered in areas of missile attack early warning. Second, Yeltsin's 1992 statement about a joint GPS was politically motivated, and intended to demonstrate the new attitude towards the United States. Third, the costs of active defenses were prohibitive. Finally, the ABM Treaty must remain as it stands. [Ref.20:p.16] Grachev subsequently stated that Russian compliance with the START I and II agreements was closely tied to U.S. compliance with the ABM Treaty. [Ref.61] Yeltsin has reiterated Russian support for the continuation of the ABM Treaty. Russia evidently fears that the dissolution of the treaty would allow the United States to make rapid technological progress and to deploy ground- and space-based BMD systems unopposed, while Russia is unable to compete.

This sentiment also affects any possibility of renegotiating the ABM Treaty. If Russia were to appear as bargaining from a position of weakness or being "bought out" by the West, the old Russian conservative social order might mount a destabilizing or paralyzing domestic political campaign against such efforts. Support for ending the ABM Treaty nonetheless does exist in some circles in Russia, as indicated by statements of Alexander Savelyev of the Institute for National Security and Strategic Studies in Moscow. Savelyev states that "the ABM Treaty must be abandoned as soon as possible because it creates real obstacles for further improvement of Russian-American relations...." [Ref.57:p.107]

## **B. FUTURE OF U.S.-RUSSIAN BMD POLICY**

The dissolution of the USSR in December 1991 has had multiple implications for both U.S. and Russian BMD developments and strategic cultures. The delegitimization of the Soviet ideology has resulted in not only the reclassification of national security threats in new ideological terms, but also the concession that a command-economy focused mostly on supporting the military was ineffective in maintaining the country's integrity. Russia suddenly found itself without its security buffer zone against European and Asian threats, and some of the new neighbors now hold nuclear weapons under ambiguous control. [Ref.24:p.10]

### **1. Future of BMD**

The U.S. proposal of GPALS in 1991 recognized the diminished U.S. *perception* of the Soviet strategic threat and the increasing concern about an accidental or unauthorized launch from the USSR, as well as the long-term threat that might be posed by Third World ballistic missiles. The United States hailed the dissolution of the USSR as the great victory of democracy over communism. The expectations for Russia, at least those publicly voiced, seemed to assume that "democratic and capitalist phoenix" could arise from the ashes of communism. Obviously the difficulty of introducing and implementing unfamiliar theories in a country which stretches across eleven time zones was not readily apparent to some. Again the United States displayed its weak grasp of the magnitude of the

challenges; such profound changes cannot occur overnight or possibly even in this generation.

Many in the United States have overreacted optimistically to Russian statements. In view of this, Henry Kissinger criticized the premise of the Charter for American-Russian Partnership and Friendship as exemplifying the U.S. tendency towards ethnocentric thinking. The widespread American assumption is that with the end of communism the spread of democracy will guarantee permanent peace. Russia now is assumed to share identical goals, thereby allowing the "strategic partnership" to promote and defend *common* democratic values throughout the world. [Ref.30] Many informed and experienced observers have expressed deep concerns and skepticism about such an idea. [Ref.55]

Both countries have refocused their efforts towards the domestic economy and away from defense. Funding for U.S. strategic defense programs has been cut, owing to the perceived absence of a strategic threat, and BMD programs have been reprioritized to address emerging regional threats. Elements of the USSR's BMD system are now dispersed throughout several new independent states, and Russia's military needs are being subjugated even further to economic and domestic considerations.

Considering economic constraints alone, the likelihood of either the United States or Russia deploying a substantial strategic BMD system in the foreseeable future is minimal. The recognition of the dangers from the global

proliferation of ballistic missiles and nuclear technology, plus Russia's new security situation, have refocused BMD efforts towards mobile ATBM systems.

A previously inconceivable effort was initiated in late 1991 to explore the options for U.S.-Russian cooperative development of BMD. Reagan had broached the idea of sharing BMD technology but not actual defense systems. Boris Yeltsin in January 1992 initially signalled a readiness to jointly design and create a jointly operated BMD system, the Global Protection System (GPS), in place of the U.S. SDI program. [Ref.41] This offer was later withdrawn, probably under strong pressure from the military establishment. However, as noted above, Yeltsin did inquire about GPS at the 1993 Vancouver Summit. Some analysts believe that the Russians may be taking a more positive view of BMD than in the past and may be amenable to allowing limited BMD deployments by the United States beyond what permitted by the ABM Treaty. [Ref.55]

## **2. Future of the ABM Treaty**

The ABM Treaty remains central to any future strategic BMD pursuits. Whether the treaty is ignored, abrogated, amended or made multilateral, its status will be largely determined by the U.S.-Russian relationship and by national choices. Russia's security perceptions and political stability will be key variables.

The United States has recently signalled its willingness to stay within the bounds of the ABM Treaty, by lowering SDIO's bureaucratic status (indeed, by renaming the organization) and by emphasizing TMD development. These U.S. decisions may have been influenced by a desire to avoid putting further internal

domestic pressure on Yeltsin's government, but they are also consistent with several U.S. strategic cultural characteristics noted in the previous section.

Russia has strongly linked the ABM Treaty with its international image. Moscow's insistence that the ABM Treaty is still legitimate is in part intended to ensure that the United States does not unilaterally proceed with BMD development and deployment beyond treaty limits. If Moscow did not think this was sufficient, it could press for making the treaty multilateral. The likelihood that major changes to the Treaty could be agreed upon in this situation is extremely low. However, Moscow may find this option more self-constraining, especially if its traditional view of the rule of law changes, i.e., toward a perspective more compatible with that of the United States.



## V. CONCLUSION

How will Russian strategic culture be modified as a result of the Soviet experience? Will divergent U.S. and Russian strategic cultures lead to continued independent BMD pursuits, or will the potential exist for cooperation in BMD development and deployment? What will be the future of the ABM Treaty?

Owing to the difficulty in developing a hard definition of a country's strategic culture to be used in analyzing national strategy, some may be inclined to dismiss strategic culture outright as an impractical analytical method. It could be claimed that economic, technological and even bureaucratic methods provide more focused and more reliable "hard" analysis. Nevertheless, the conclusions this thesis has presented indicate that strategic culture is a sound method when its limits are recognized. As stated before, no one theory can offer a complete explanation or consistently reliable forecasts of a nation's strategy and actions. Examination of complex issues, such as national strategy, requires the use of multiple, diverse perspectives if a deeper understanding is to be achieved.

Long-standing ideological principles, such as democracy and constitutionality, heavily affect U.S. strategic culture, as does the more recent emphasis on quantitative strategic analysis. The American experiences of war (and relatively limited encounters with defeat) have resulted in the cultural characteristics of a relatively low threshold for withstanding pain and the belief

that victory must entail no more than modest levels of U.S. casualties. Moreover, the perception of security threats as distant and the reliance on technical "fixes" to international problems have allowed U.S. national strategy to focus on the near-term and to rely on crisis response measures, especially with a lower risk of global war. The pluralistic American government, although it impedes the development and implementation of long-term strategy, does allow multiple perspectives to coexist and often to overcome shortcomings in national policy. Despite the consequences of the dissolution of the USSR on the international environment, U.S. strategic culture does not seem to have radically changed at this point in time.

U.S. decisionmakers must realize that Russia's first concern is for Russia, not the maintenance of international order. Rooted in the American strategic culture is an abhorrence of instability, and it remains inconceivable to many Americans that, now with the disappearance of the "evil empire", instability is still present. With this mind-set, any conflicts which occur may be considered problematic "fires" which can be easily put out. It is not possible for major systemic problems to exist, it is widely assumed, since it has been proven that "good" (i.e., democracy) will prevail. Therefore, only limited "fire-fighting equipment" (i.e., ATBM) is needed. Here again the United States depends on technical solutions to solve potentially serious political and strategic problems.

In contrast, the collapse of the USSR has had major consequences for Russia's strategic culture. First, Russia's threat perception has been refocused to

regional dangers closer to its borders. Second, the "myth" of the great Red Army has been broken and the population's support for the military has been vastly reduced. The military and political dominance over strategy-making nonetheless remains essentially unchanged. Also the military appears to be operating under basically the same doctrine as during the Soviet period. Third, with the political turmoil in Moscow political power is becoming more diffused to regional authorities. In addition, many in Moscow are struggling against various extremist political movements to replace the guiding ideology of Marxism-Leninism with "something else," that is, a more democratic and market-oriented system of government. However, to achieve these goals Russia must also enhance the role of the rule of law and constitutional order. Russia's international prestige and superpower status had been traditionally sought via military means. Nonetheless, with Russia's current situation, Moscow is obliged to rely on political and diplomatic means in order to maintain an approximation of its former status.

Considering the competition within the Russian government between conservative and quasi-liberal factions; the USSR's dissolution; military disapproval of the situation; and the relatively few major institutional reforms, Russian discussion of mutual BMD development is a good strategic move on Moscow's part. It throws Washington into internal disarray as the U.S. agencies argue over the advantages, disadvantages and modalities of aid to the former adversary. Russia can prevent any U.S. abrogation of the ABM Treaty and unilateral BMD activity beyond the treaty's limits, because the United States is so

concerned with legality; the United States realizes that Russia still considers the ABM Treaty to be legitimate. This gives Russia time to get its house in order, while at the same time actually getting access to U.S. funds, technology, and intelligence resources as the United States tries to persuade Russia that participation in a global protection system would be to its benefit. With very little effort Russia can receive enormous benefits while allowing the United States to "bare its soul" in its eagerness to win a new friend. Once Russia is back on its feet, the United States may suddenly realize that it has bared more than its soul, to the detriment of its own security.

The ABM Treaty's future depends on the status of the U.S.-Russian relationship and the resultant BMD policy decisions. The United States has apparently underscored its willingness to remain within the ABM Treaty by changing the emphasis of BMD research and development to theater-level defenses. The proposal for a GPS was in part intended to revise the basis of the U.S.-Russian relationship to one based on cooperative, strategic defensive missions rather than one based on offensive strategic weapons. Discussions about a GPS system may continue but more as an exploration of confidence-building measures than a program for operational deployment. Considering the prominence of law in American strategic culture, it is unlikely that the United States will unilaterally abrogate the Treaty unless an unmistakable threat to U.S. national security arises.

Russia has linked compliance with START I and II to U.S. compliance with the ABM Treaty. Russia is relying on diplomatic measures to retain the

appearance of power on the international scene. Moscow is unlikely to renegotiate the Treaty if it perceives itself to be in a position of weakness. Russia's domestic situation clearly does not give BMD as a whole very high priority, but the ABM Treaty is considered important for its political image. Once Russia's political and economic situation improves, it may more vigorously pursue the development of a GPS-type system in order to gain a larger and more legitimate global role and reestablish its international status. Rather than a cooperative GPS-type arrangement, however, a future Russia might revert to Muscovite traditions of autocracy and expansionism; it might then pursue unilateral measures in BMD and other military capabilities that would be damaging to the security of other nations, including the United States.

If strategic BMD deployments beyond those allowed by the 1974 protocol to the ABM Treaty are to be made, the ABM Treaty must be changed or abrogated. The possible receptivity of Russia in various circumstances to amending the ABM Treaty to permit various types of expanded deployments, including ground- or space-based, remains highly dependent on the course of domestic politics in Russia. Some elite circles in Russia, particularly supporters of Yeltsin in the scientific community, might be more open to transferring BMD technology, sharing early warning data, and participating in a global protective system. The current trend in Russian elite circles seems to be one of growing caution about such cooperation with the United States.

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